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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICES: THE CASE OF FRENCH DOCTORAL 
EDUCATION 
Abstract 
Based on empirical research on the effect of doctoral schools in French 
university, this paper analyses under which conditions the implementation of 
a new institution impacts work practices i.e. the ways by which individuals 
and collective actors perform their activity. It focuses on the micro-practices of 
actors, in order to shed new light on the micro-level works which put the new 
institution into action. 
The paper contributes to existing theory in three different ways. First, it shows 
that institutional change does not generate new practices per se. Institutional 
change impacts work practices if the pre-existing practices are close to the 
new desired norm as promoted by the new institution. It thus emphasises 
proximity as a main mechanism of new practice diffusion, when actors are 
interdependent on each other. Second, in professional contexts based on 
practices distant from the new desired norm, actors adopt the new institution 
and change their practices if they are able to solve unaddressed problems. 
Such a dynamic is mainly based on the creation of new organisational 
arrangements or tools which mediate and enable problem solving activities. 
Finally, it proposes a delayed and indirect effect of the introduction of the new 
institution. By generating new interactions among actors, the new institution 
creates opportunities for comparisons across professions, legitimating one 
amongst the several existing norms in the field. Comparison amongst actors or 
disciplines leads to some categorising themselves as deviants, who lose 
legitimacy and power in the organisation. 
 
Keywords: professional practices, institution, institution change, university. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of diffusion is central to institutional theory. When studying professional 
associations, standards or organisational forms (Durand et al., 2005; Greenwood et al., 2005; 
Greenwood et al., 2002), the process of institutionalization is described as the diffusion of 
innovation process, the object being first recognised by few actors and then widely diffused 
and accepted. Lawrence and Suddaby (Lawrence et al., 2006) note that for many years, the 
archetypal form of institutional research has been to examine the diffusion process and the 
factors that have led organisations to adopt particular structures or practices.  
Drawing on Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) call for opening up the ‘black box’ of diffusion, 
this paper analyses the conditions under which the implementation of a new institution 
impacts work practices i.e. the ways by which individuals and collective actors perform their 
activity. It focuses on the micro-practices of actors, in order to shed new light on the micro-
level works which put the new institution into action. The first section of the paper reviews 
the interplay between institutions and practices. On the one hand, institutions are based on 
legitimated and maintained practices. On the other hand, institutional change influences the 
way problems are formulated, the notion of efficiency and the organisation of day to day 
work. Therefore, evolution of practices may be a result of institutional change. 
The second section presents the institutional change under review, the diffusion of doctoral 
schools within French Universities. They were introduced in 1992 and made compulsory for 
all universities in 1999. The diffusion is thus completed, but the actions and effects of 
doctoral schools vary from one school to another. We study the effects of the institutional 
workings of five doctoral schools within the same university, i.e. the same local institutional 
and organizational context. 
The discussion section highlights the contributions of the paper to the existing theory. The 
study of the impacts of institutional change on work practices reveals three main results. First 
of all, it shows that institutional change does not generate new practices per se. Institutional 
change impacts work practices if the existing practices are close to the new desired norm 
promoted by the new institution. Proximity is thus emphasised as a main mechanism diffusion 
of new practices when actors are interdependent on each other. Interdependency may be 
intrinsic to the scientific activity (division of work, sharing of equipment or key resources) 
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and organisational (collective decision making process, common scientific policy, etc.).  
Second, in professional contexts based on practices distant from the new desired norm, new 
practices linked to the new institution diffuse only if they are able to solve a problem not 
addressed beforehand. Actors adopt the new institution and change their practices if it can 
assist them in solving existing but unaddressed problems. Such solutions are likely to be 
based on the creation of new organisational arrangements or tools which mediate and enable 
problem solving activities. In contrast, the diffusion of new practices proves difficult if not 
impossible without such a mediating arrangement: A common tool or arrangement creates an 
opportunity for action which may correspond to the norm promoted by the new institution. 
Common tools or organisational arrangements channel the actor’s strategy. It thus suggests 
complexity beyond the ‘heroic’ character of the institutional entrepreneur (Dorado, 2005; 
Garud et al., 2002; Maguire et al., 2004; Munir et al., 2005), allowing a diversity of actor 
strategies around the adoption of the new institution. Finally, it proposes a delayed and 
indirect effect of the introduction of the new institution. By generating new interactions 
between actors, the new institution creates opportunities for comparisons across professions, 
legitimating one norm amongst the several existing norms in the field. Comparison amongst 
actors or disciplines leads to a self-categorisation as deviants who loose legitimacy and power 
in the organisation. Comparison amongst actors or disciplines leads to some categorising 
themselves as deviants, who loose legitimacy and power in the organisation. 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 
1.1. Institutions are not frozen 
The institutionalist perspective is based on the idea that there are enduring elements in the 
social life called institutions that have profound effects on the thoughts, feelings and 
behaviour of individual and collective actors. Scott (Scott, 2001) has underlined how 
organizational behaviours are shaped by institutions i.e. taken-for-granted, resilient social 
prescriptions, sometimes encoded in laws which specify the boundaries of the field, its 
membership rules and the role of identities and appropriate organisational forms in its 
constituent communities (Roa et al., 2003). Hargrave and Van de Ven (Hargrave et al., 2006) 
define institutions as “humanly devised schemas, norms and regulations that enable and 
constrain the behaviour of social actors and make life predictable and meaningful. They 
distinguish institutional actors (or entities) from institutional arrangements, with the term 
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institutions referring to the latter. Institutional arrangements may apply to a single 
institutional actor or more broadly”, (p866). The enduring dimension of institutions brings 
about the paradox of change that is obviously also a part of institutional life. As Scott notes 
(2001:187), “in highly institutionalized systems, endogenous change seems almost 
contradictory to institution.” 
The paper focuses on institutional change i.e. a difference in form, quality or state over time 
of an institution. When studying institutional change, scholars usually examine the origin of 
change. Oliver (Oliver, 1992) and Dacin et al. (Dacin et al., 2002) seek to identify the locus, 
processes and drivers of institutional change. Greenwood and Suddaby (Greenwood et al., 
2005) underline how new ideas come from the margins of the field where organisations are 
less embedded, less privileged and more exposed to institutional contradictions. They also 
analyse the types of organizational responses to institutional change (Oliver, 1991), or the role 
of actors in the transformation of existing institutions through the study of institutional 
entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004). Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) 
propose to consider institutional work i.e. “the purposive actions of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating maintaining and disrupting institutions”. They propose 
entering the ‘black box’ to document, analyse and understand the practices through which 
actors create or maintain institutions. In doing so, they shed light not only on the diffusion 
side but also on the adoption/adaptation process through which actors implement and adapt 
institutions.  
However, beyond the process of institutional work, remains the question of the effect of 
institutional change on day-to-day activities and work practices, i.e. of the performative effect 
of institutions on the ways in which individuals or collective actors perform their jobs. The 
relationship between practices and institutions is two-fold. On the one hand, institutions are 
based on existing routines and practices which form enduring elements of social activity. 
Lawrence and Suddaby review the role of practices in the institutional field (2006). The 
notion of practices refers to situated actions performed by actors in order to achieve a result. 
Simlarly, professional practices are actions performed by actors to achieve their mission in 
their professional environment. The definition of practice is based on the works of Pierre 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1972) (1980). Bourdieu insists that “practice is both necessary and 
relatively autonomous regarding a given situation, because it is the product of the dialectical 
relationship between a situation and a habitus.” A habitus is “defined as a system of enduring 
and transposable dispositions that, integrating every past experience, functions at each 
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moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions, and enable the completion of 
infinitely diverse tasks, thanks to analogic transfer of schemes enabling the resolution of 
problems related to shapes, and thanks to the ongoing corrections of results that are obtained, 
dialectically produced by these results.” Therefore practices stem from a series of trials and 
errors, have been proved efficient by those who are using them, and are transmitted by 
proximity rather than explicitly. Practices are a very deeply rooted ways of doing things that 
has been working efficiently so far, in terms of the problems that have to be solved.  
On the other hand, institutional change influences the ways that problems are formulated, the 
organisation’s definition of efficiency (Baden-Fuller et al., 2000) and the organisation of day 
to day work. Institutional change promotes new norms, new criteria of performance. 
Therefore, evolution of practices may be a result of institutional change which influences 
values, rules, myths, representations. How does the shift from one way of doing things to 
another happen? What are the impacts of institutional change?  
1.2. Institutional change and the evolution of practices 
Two main contributions to the articulation between institutional change and work practices 
have been identified. Phillips et al. document the emergence of common practices when 
actors from different fields collaborate. As participants to collaborative efforts belong to 
existing organisations, they will bring with them sets of ideas and practices that are 
institutionalised in their respective fields (Bourdieu, 1988). Early actions in the collaboration 
process will begin to establish the practice standards that will guide their efforts. Phillips et al. 
(2000) argue that dominant coalition members are likely to impose their rules and practices on 
other members. Practices are borrowed from the fields of dominant members, who have the 
power, legitimacy and critical resources to influence the design of solutions to problems. 
Boxenbaum and Battilana (Boxenbaum et al., 2005) qualified these results as they found that 
inter-organizational mobility was an important enabling condition for the transposition of 
managerial practices across fields. Finally, Phillips et al. reintroduce the notion of practices 
within institutional theory, analysing the travels of practices, but not their evolution in a 
context of institutional change. 
Robertson et al. (Robertson et al., 2003) examine the effects of institutions on micro work 
practices in the specific context of professional service in knowledge-intensive firms. They 
show that institutional context is more likely to operate in three arenas: relative professional 
work autonomy, the epistemic base of the discipline, and the formation of professional 
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practitioners’ identity. First, following Abbott (Abbott, 1988), they underline different 
institutions that influence work practices. Professional institutions (such as lawyers’ or 
physicians’ associations) cover both technical (standardizing expertise and differentiating 
from other commodities) and social means of professionalization (Baer, 1986). The definition 
of the profession’s rules and resources, and its maintenance through standards, norms and 
regulations, secures the profession’s control of particular work activities.  
Secondly, they identify the epistemological base of the profession as a second institutional 
context feature. Halliday (Halliday, 1985) distinguishes between the scientific professions 
(engineering and medicine) that rely primarily on judgements of fact, normative professions 
(the clergy and the law) that rely primarily on judgements of value, and syncretic professions 
(the military and academia) that rely on an amalgam of scientific and normative foundations. 
The different epistemological bases of the scientific (experimental science) and legal 
professions also coexist within academia. In experimental sciences, claims to knowledge are 
legitimised by the application of the scientific method (principally experimental) to natural 
and biological phenomena. Scientists work to generalise and replicate through 
instrumentations and scientific methods, validated by the scientific community, to produce 
claims which transcend particular contexts. In contrast, knowledge production in the legal 
profession remains linked to the context, and extends only to particular jurisdictions and 
particular points in time. The structure of knowledge production within scientific disciplines 
appears to be more important than its academic organisation. Thus, across different 
professions such as the law and science, and across different scientific professions, distinctive 
‘epistemic cultures’ can be found (Knorr Cetina, 1999).  
The third feature of the professional context, labelled by Schein (Schein, 1978) as the 
formation of identity, defines professional identity as the relatively stable and enduring 
constellation of attributes, beliefs, values, motives and experiences in terms of which people 
define themselves in a professional role. 
Robertson et al.’s work examines the influence of institutional context on work practices, but 
doesn’t examine through which mechanisms practices change, nor question the influence of 
institutional context in change situations. Studying the way practices are influenced by 
institutional change lead us to analyse the ways by which institutions are adopted and 
implemented within a given organisation, focusing on the implementation mechanisms of 
institutional change. Our study focuses on the implementation of doctoral schools as a new 
institution within one university. It analyses the ways in which the introduction of doctoral 
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schools influences scientific practices of academic scholars in France, mainly in terms of 
recruitment and of the supervision of PhD students. Change does occur because of a variety of 
factors, and there is rarely a direct and visible impact from one event on another. 
Nevertheless, we examine how institutional change accompanies, prevents or facilitates 
changes in practices. 
Given the aims of the study, the research questions were designed to explore 
interrelationships rather than test propositions. By selecting different doctoral schools in the 
same university, we aim to create a comparative dimension within one organisation and one 
institutional setting to analyse the evolution of the practices of scientists.  
DATA COLLECTION AND METHOD 
The context of French universities 
Doctoral schools in France were instituted by a decree in 1992. At the time, the text is just an 
outline of what a doctoral school should be in terms of shape and missions. Moreover, it did 
not have a mandatory character. Doctoral schools were progressively implemented throughout 
universities, their existence and characteristics depending greatly on local conditions. They 
finally became mandatory in 1999. New decrees (2002, 2006) followed, becoming more and 
more explicit about the shape and missions of the new entity. Each research department must 
now belong to a doctoral school, and the doctoral training it provides to their PhD students 
must take place in this frame. As a result, doctoral schools are today the only entry point for 
doctoral studies in French universities. As they are compulsory, the diffusion process is not an 
issue : from 32 doctoral schools in 1990, they became 208 in 1996 and are 314 today. 
However, there is a large diversity in the actions of different doctoral schools (DGRT, 2001). 
Doctoral school have to provide students with a doctoral training curriculum, including 
particularly professional training. They also are the main channel for the allocation of public 
scholarships (given by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research) to research 
departments. Nevertheless, they remain a flexibly shaped entity, and have not been 
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institutionalised in the same ways in different contexts. Therefore, it was important to study 
various disciplines in one single institutional and organisational context, such as one 
university, in order to locate variations of response to institutional change2. That is what 
fostered the choice of one university, covering the whole spectrum of scientific disciplines 
with five doctoral schools. This will allow us to understand the adoption of a top-down 
innovation and its impact on the evolution of practices, and to address the following 
questions: do institutional changes influence scientific practices? By which mechanisms? Do 
new institutions cross the epistemological bases and professional communities of practice?  
Case study 
These questions guided the design of our enquiry. We adopted a looser design rather than a 
precise hypothesis-testing model, but not a grounded research strategy (Suddaby, 2006). The 
research protocol outlined an explicit comparative case strategy, by analysing five doctoral 
schools in the same university, located in a large town in the west of France. Research takes 
place at the university in all disciplines. Some 25000 students are trained (from license 
through doctorate); around 200 PhDs awarded each year. Doctoral schools there typically 
include 10 research departments (except for one that has 40) They train 250 to 300 PhD 
students each, and have 100 to 200 potential supervisors. 
We used a qualitative approach to construct five case studies (Stake, 2005) to understand the 
qualitative changes in practices that followed the emergence of doctoral schools. As we seek 
to analyse the influence of institutional changes on practices, our interpretative methods 
address questions of process i.e. the study of evolution of behaviour within organizations, 
focusing on how organisational context, activity and actions unfold over time (Pettigrew, 
1997). Such research is field-based, involving interviews to capture the observations of 
various stakeholders. We used the narrative strategy of qualitative research (Langley, 1999) to 
make sense of our data.  
Table 1: Main characteristics of the doctoral schools  
                                                 
 
2 To know more about the French university system, see Musselin C. 2005. Le marché des universitaires: 
France, Allemagne et Etats-Unis. Presses de Sciences Po: Paris 
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Doctoral schools Engineering 
sciences 
Mechanics, 
Thermics, 
Urban 
engineering 
Chemistry 
Biology 
Law & 
social 
sciences 
Literature 
language & 
civilizations 
Doctoral students 210 208 250 320 248 
Research 
departments 9 9 40 10 14 
Professors and 
researchers 280 n.a. n.a. 170 209 
Including: PhD 
supervisors 120 100 233 90 79 
PhD 
completed/year 50 40 50 31 30 
Average PhD 
completion (year) n.a. 3.51 3.65 n.a. 4,63 
Public PhD 
scholarship (2005) 20 17 15 8 8 
n.a. : not available 
This paper is based on archival sources, such as the decrees that instituted the doctoral school, 
and qualitative interviews. 50 semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the 
scientific boards, supervisors, students, administrative staff at all five doctoral schools, to give 
participants the opportunity to speak in their own voices, and introduce and reflect on the 
issues they perceived to be relevant.  
We began with the scientific board members at the chemistry-biology doctoral school, where 
we interviewed all the members of the scientific committee. We then extended the field to the 
other schools by a “snowballing” method. Interviews were organized around informers’ 
activity (as managers, teachers or supervisors) and participants were invited to reflect on their 
practices within doctoral schools. They were asked to describe the PhD track, from the 
recruitment to the day the dissertation is awarded. The object was to understand what a 
doctoral school is about (its day-to-day missions and activities; the set up of common rules 
regarding grant distribution, student recruitment, supervision norms if they exist, and links 
with higher levels in the university: presidency, ministry, etc.), and what supervising is about. 
It also aimed to draw attention to any change mentioned by informers, to tensions, problems 
and issues tackled in the set up of the doctoral school, or more generally in the practice of 
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their activity.  
Five interviews were performed with the university management/presidential team3, focussing 
on their activity in general, the role of doctoral schools from a university governance point of 
view, what kind of expectations were invested in the project, and the history of the set up. 
Seven interviews were also performed with doctoral students, where our interest focused on 
how they found their scholarship if any, how they chose their topic, their supervisor, what 
they are doing in terms of research or any other kind of work. 
Interviews were transcribed and analysed so as to highlight the main categories of informers’ 
perceptions and practices. Verbatim responses were then sorted along two main categories, to 
highlight scientific practices and their evolutions.  
- The first category concerned the recruitment of PhD students. What was considered a 
good profile? What were the issues related to the distribution of grants in a several-
disciplines scientific board? How was a common arrangement for judgement 
constructed, etc.? 
- The second categories focused on the activity of supervising, examining what 
supervisors defined as their practice, what skills they wanted to transmit, and what did 
they think was important for becoming a professional scientist (Andrews et al., 1967)? 
We also searched for possible norms regarding the number of students per supervisor, 
the rules a supervisor imposed on himself before accepting a student, (for example, 
can a supervisor supervise on a topic he does not know or that is not his specialty?) 
What is supervising? What is being supervised? What is a PhD student, what is his 
function for the research department? Finally, what is a PhD for: is gaining a diploma 
seen as a personal achievement, or as the first step in a professional career? 
These two categories are considered as variables taking different values across time and 
disciplines. The comparison between values would allow us to measure and describe 
differences as well as changes in practices in supervising and training future researchers, 
which clearly have links with scientific practices. 
                                                 
 
3 Although some actors were interviewed primarily as university managers or doctoral school scientific council 
members, the subject of supervising practices was systematically explored whenever relevant. 
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The fieldwork allowed us to select situations involving evolution or non-evolution of 
practices and suggest categorizations into different cases (Becker, 1998). We distinguished 
cases where:  
- The situation reflects evolution vs. non evolution: We labelled a practice as “new” 
when actors feel the need to justify and legitimate it, with a discourse that is still 
foreign enough to them that they need to mention it. Beside situations where evolution 
of practice can be located, we have encountered situations where a practice doesn’t 
evolve in spite of pressure from the institutional context. We have labelled this 
situation as “non-evolution”, to express the fact that it can only be characterized and 
identified in comparison to “evolution”. 
- The institutional field (professions) concerned were close to vs. far from the norm: 
Following Haliday (1985) and Robertson et al. (2003), we distinguish between two 
institutional contexts, based on the epistemological base on the disciplines. On the one 
hand, experiment-based, collectively organized disciplines which are close to the 
norms suggested by the new institution (mandatory funding, duration of PhD roughly 
matching the desired norm of 3 years, collective research projects, connection with the 
industry, etc.). On the other hand, individual based disciplines, with independent 
research programs, that find themselves far from the promoted norms (80% of students 
are not funded, duration of PhD exceeds the recommended 3 years, the main source of 
funding is the State, etc.). We hypothesise that the reactions to institutional pressure 
will differ along two factors: closeness to the desired new norm makes the adoption of 
new practices easier and more likely, as it involves merely adapting existing ones; 
resource dependency can be a strong driver to adopting new desired practices, from 
the perspectives of enhancing, or at least not reducing, current resources. 
- The evolution of practices is a direct response to the new institution, vs. not 
specifically related. Some of the evolutions – or resistances – are obvious responses to 
the set up of the new institution. Actors describe their evolution as a direct result of 
either a demand of, or an opportunity offered by, the new institution, while non-
evolutionary responses, are explicitly described as resistance to institutional pressure. 
By contrast, there are evolution and resistance limiting changes promoted by doctoral 
schools, but that are not directly related to it, such as professionalisation. Evolution 
happened before, outside, or without the new institution, or non-evolutionary 
situations existed before and are not described as resistance to the new institution. 
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RESULTS 
Doctoral schools impose formal obligations, such as a collective decision making process for 
recruiting, or the requirement to set up a doctoral training curriculum. How do supervisors 
respond to these institutional pressures? How does that impact practices? Through which 
mechanisms? We now examine these questions on two particular missions where the doctoral 
schools are intervening: recruiting and supervising. 
Recruiting doctoral students 
What does the reform do? 
Doctoral Schools are changing the rules that govern the access to a critical resource i.e. 
scholarships for PhD students. Before doctoral schools were set up, grants were given by the 
Ministry of Research (a discipline-based bureau) to the director of Masters programme, who 
decided which students would received them, generally the best in the class. Since the 
institution of doctoral schools, grants are given by the Ministry to the doctoral school, that is, 
to the assembly of research departments. What was formerly an individual procedure has 
become a collective one. With this change, the Ministry intended to concentrate resources on 
one point of decision, and foster the building of a more consistent scientific policy for making 
choices between projects and priority definitions within the group of teams. As a result, the 
scientific council of each doctoral school has the task of setting up a common scientific policy 
and a common set of rules for organizing the distribution of grants among research 
departments. 
Consequences: organisational response to institutional change and new practices 
In the experimental science doctoral schools, setting up common grants distribution 
procedures has led to the adoption of two practices: 
- opening recruitment to students from outside the university 
- funding being directed towards a project rather than a student 
Opening recruitment to students from outside the university 
Supervisors were used to relying heavily on interpersonal relationship with students in 
deciding who they want to work with.  
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Would you take the risk of working with someone for 
three years without having heard him beforehand? 
Without having seen him? Well, I think… no, I don’t think 
it could be an option… (nan-dir-bio-CS-CB-1) 
 
All supervisors underscore how important it is for them to know the candidate personally, to 
have seen him at work, to gain critical information they could never obtain from an oral 
examination. They need to know how the student integrates and reacts within a team. They 
have learnt how to distinguish a student who is good for research - that is, curious, 
autonomous but with a sense of team – from a good student – someone who can synthesise 
and repeat existing knowledge but does not necessarily show creativity and curiosity. This is 
how they gain confidence or trust in their future PhD student. 
We spend a lot of time, particularly with Master’s 
students. This is when the student and the supervisor get to 
know each other and become a “couple”, which is meant 
to last, to my opinion, during the 3 years of the PhD. If 
things are going well, I mean, the “chemistry” is not an 
easy thing to get, if this is happening, I think it is 
interesting to keep that couple, student and supervisor. 
[…] I think we should not destroy that first step between a 
Master’s student and his supervisor, if there is a possibility 
of funding. (nan-dir-bio-cs-cb-14/1-2) 
 
However open recruitment, to comply with Ministry requirements, would mean that 
supervisors had to recruit people they would not know beforehand. How to replace (or do 
without) that irreplaceable source of knowledge about people: observation in everyday 
situations? They did so by organizing a competition open to all students, by projects. They 
were reluctant to take the risk of recruiting a student they would meet only once, and hear in 
oral examination, but at the same time, they hoped to “please the Ministry” (because of the 
number of grants that were at stake). They also acknowledged that this new procedure would 
give them the opportunity to enlarge the pool of recruitment and have access to better students 
than if they were limited to those from within the university. Finally, it was seen as a “a good 
thing” if mobility across research departments and universities could be enhanced. In the end, 
very few students from the outside were recruited in the first year of the competition, but 
enough to create a precedent, and the procedure and the justification could now be seen as in 
existence, and as legitimate. 
Funding being directed towards a project rather than a student 
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In fact, this practice already existed in some professions, such as in chemistry. Biologists, on 
the other hand, described the relationship between a student and his supervisor as a “moral 
contract” (Stephan et al., 1997), from the outset of the Masters course.  
Grants used to be targeted only on the student’s merit. If a 
student was the first in his Master’s class, he would get a 
grant in the research department where he was working. 
OK? That was the rule. So the problem was, the deal was 
utterly a moral one between the future PhD student and his 
Master’s supervisor. The latter would do anything so that 
his student would be the first in his class, so as to get the 
grant. Then, he did not have any trouble financing him for 
his PhD. (nan-dir-bio-CS-CB-1) 
 
Making a collective decision across disciplines and ranking students from different disciplines 
has proved to be a major problem.  
Ranking students from completely different background, 
with completely different curricula etc… is far from 
simple… Ranking biology students and chemistry 
students… I don’t know who can do that, probably no 
one…(nan-dir-chi-cs-cb-6/3) 
 
The shift from asking the best student to choose among predefined projects, to choosing 
projects that will be funded and then recruit a good student - not necessarily the best – to staff 
it, requires agreement as to the choice of projects, or at least on ways of selecting relevant 
projects. 
Doctoral schools have managed to avoid establishing cross-discipline criteria about projects 
or students by relying on objective, measurable criteria, such as the size of the research 
department (reflecting its capacity of training), or their level of accreditation (reflecting 
institutional recognition from the Ministry). These criteria are thought to represent the quality 
and the reputation of the labs. On the top of these, the rule of “tour de role” persists: in any 
discipline, it is a basic principle that grants should not always go to the same labs.  
My point [as a member of the board] is not to run for my 
team. I represent the doctoral school. All I ask for is that 
we take the history into account. That the grants do not go 
always to the same labs. (nan-dir-bio-cs-cba-17/6) 
 
As in the case of opening recruitment, funding a project rather than awarding a student means 
giving up recruitment practices such as a direct personal relationship with the student. 
However, supervisors do acknowledge that “it is not for students to decide the scientific 
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policy”, thus justifying the primary targeting on projects, and the effort on their part to rely 
partly on impersonal criteria to recruit students, such as establishing a minimum rank in the 
student’s Master’s degree (in the top 30% based on marks). Finally, while supervisors have 
the last word on recruitment, it is seen as legitimate for doctoral schools to set up minimum 
quality standards for candidates. 
As a practice, such collective decision making processes generate additional effects, leading 
to discussions about what is a PhD for, who is a good candidate, who are we recruiting for? 
Scientists never talked about such matters before, or compared their selection and recruiting 
across disciplines.  
Within the recruiting process, new practices have appeared and spread. However, the shift 
from asking the best student to choose among predefined projects, to choosing projects that 
will be funded and then recruit a good enough student to staff it, requires agreement on 
scientific priorities. Doctoral schools have had to write documents to define and agree on their 
scientific policy, which supposes that the school is able to define its policy. However, the 
legitimate level for defining scientific priorities is the research department. As doctoral 
schools are multidisciplinary, it is difficult to find consistency between research programs, 
especially in disciplines where researchers do not traditionally work on a collective basis, 
with a weak degree of interdependency (such as history, literature, law etc.). In disciplines 
with higher degrees of interdependency (such as experimental sciences) it is easier to define 
projects of research, but the difficulty then is prioritising projects from different disciplines. 
As a result, scientific policies made at the doctoral school level tend to be a collection of what 
already exists, rather than a plan for the future. Interdisciplinary research projects tend not to 
emerge from the new institutional arrangement: while everybody acknowledges that they now 
know their colleagues from other disciplines better, this has not yet shown in common 
research projects. 
Despite the existence of a written scientific policy, members of the schools’ boards have 
managed (as in the past) not to assess their colleagues’ projects on scientific quality grounds. 
Instead, they have continued to justify their assessments of research departments by such 
quality signals as the department’s administrative status, the number of potential PhD 
supervisors involved, etc.. No common currency i.e. well accepted set of criteria to prioritise 
research projects has been established between doctoral school colleagues, and some 
previously-existent practices, such as “tour de role”, coexist with new funding practices. 
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Supervising doctoral students 
What does the reform do? 
As far as supervisors of doctoral students are concerned, the introduction of Doctoral Schools 
has established two new requirements; the introduction of a written contract between student, 
supervisor and the doctoral school, and the introduction of professionalized training.  
First, the introduction of a written contract, to be signed between the student, the head of the 
research department, the head of the Doctoral School and the supervisor, formalizes the 
existence of the official link between all these parties, whether there is a funding or not. It sets 
rules regarding the PhD: 3 years duration, mandatory funding, and a mediation procedure in 
case of problems. The charter was introduced by decree following an initiative from life 
science PhD students seeking to have their status recognized and protected. It is based on 
norms that are generally applied in experimental, equipment-based disciplines. 
All students sign the contract. While it already matches the existing practices in experimental 
sciences, it has not been a normal routine in human and social sciences. However, some 
supervisors underline the fact that this structure is not suitable for them, especially with regard 
to the necessity of funding and the duration of the PhD.  
Everyone [amongst human and social scientists] thinks 
that the Charter of PhD is often poorly adapted to specific 
doctoral schools’ culture. (nan-dir-droit-cs-ds37/27) 
 
Through setting requirements for competition for public grants, Doctoral Schools are 
sometimes imposing additional rules and norms regarding supervising, such as:  
- a limited number of students per supervisor to enhance the quality of the supervision 
and to reduce ‘mandarinal’ behaviour; 
- A limited amount of public grants per supervisor at any one point in time, to allow 
different scholars to benefit these grants and work with PhDs. 
- The authorization of the Doctoral Schools is required for students to register beyond 
the third year, which reinforces the “3 year norm”.  
 
Second, doctoral schools have to organize doctoral training as required by the administrative 
act instituting them. This concern is related to the need for professionalization.  
There was, to start with, a direction from the ministry, to 
set up in priority professionalizing training sessions. The 
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idea is that not every doctor is going to be a teacher or a 
researcher, and that we should have them adapting to the 
job market outside academia. This means training about 
relationships with the enterprises, how it works within a 
firm. (nan-dir-bio-cs-cb-4/19-21) 
 
Thus all Schools organize training, usually of three kinds:  
- Professionalizing training: Students learn about writing a résumé, strategies to build 
a professional project and looking for a job, etc.. They learn about the job markets, and 
the possible positions they could think of after their PhD 
- Discipline-oriented training: These sessions are usually about giving students from 
one discipline insight about another discipline, to encourage or facilitate cross-
disciplinary projects in the future, or simply, to create a dynamic inside a multi-
disciplinary school 
- General topic oriented training: these sessions aim at improving English writing 
skills, or methodologies such as database, bibliography, etc.. They can also be 
organized around general topics of concern for scientists, such as the relationships 
between science and society. 
 
These training sessions are open to all PhD students, to mix those from different disciplines. 
However, practices across Schools remain different; the three experimental science Schools 
have made the doctoral training mandatory, setting a number of training hours necessary for 
the student to gain a PhD, while in human and social sciences the training remains optional. In 
addition, except for those few scholars involved in organising the training, very few 
supervisors actually integrate it as a new resource for their students. Attitudes clearly go from 
“it is a waste of time, it is bad for the work” to “it is an administrative obligation, why not, but 
I don’t see the point” to “students have to do it, we will check that they are doing it”. Only 
rarely does a supervisor wonder how to build a relevant training program for his student, 
based on his intellectual origin and his professional project.  
Organizational response to institutional change 
The content of supervision does not seem to have changed over time, in any discipline, and 
the core of supervising practices has not been affected by the introduction of Doctoral 
Schools. No mention of such a change is found in the interviews, and the duration of PhDs 
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seem to have remained similar, even when it exceeds the norm of three years. Those changes 
that are mentioned by informers - using expressions such as “today…” “Nowadays…” or “it 
is not the way it used to be…” - relate mostly to the themes of professionalization and 
mobility. 
In terms of professionalization, if the thesis remains the main output of the PhD, the PhD 
work has been enriched. For most supervisors in experimental science, it is important that the 
PhD is part of the student’s professional project. The PhD is not considered as a goal in itself, 
but as an exercise a step towards reaching a higher level in a profession, that of a researcher. 
Most supervisors are also aware that the majority of their students will not find a job in the 
academia, research or teaching position.  
Supervisors used to tell PhD students, if you’re doing 
well, you will get a position in academia. We don’t talk 
like that anymore. Positions in academia are extremely 
scarce. They may find a job in research in industry or in 
administration rather than research. It is not easy to say. 
(nan-dir-bio-cs-cb-17/4) 
 
Therefore, PhD needs also to be a training for the wider job market, and recognized as such 
by future employers. Professionalizing the quality of the PhD is also a concern in the human 
and social sciences, although less central and less systematically mentioned. Interviews show 
awareness about the topic, but also a feeling of helplessness. Some supervisors discuss with 
their future students the issue of professionalization and the scarcity of opportunities. 
The second feature that is changing in supervising activity is the attention given to the need 
for mobility. Many informers say that “today, one cannot make a career without mobility”, 
arguing that it is important to see how other people work in other places, in France or abroad. 
Supervisors recognise that students should be encouraged to do the first or second year of 
their Master’s internships in a different research department. PhD students often gain great 
benefits from post-doctoral appointments abroad, and senior researchers also think researchers 
should change laboratory after a decade, to keep their interest fresh. However, again, mobility 
is not seen as an issue in the human and social sciences. 
The new features we noticed, such as the necessity of adding elements of professionalizing, 
scientific and general culture to a PhD, and the need for mobility, were not created by the 
emergence of Doctoral Schools, but have been facilitated by them. In Schools where 
professionalization and mobility were already highly valued, the School’s organisation was 
used as a tool or frame to encourage these ideas and facilitate their realization. In Schools 
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where such features were not valued, no particular system seems to have been set up to 
encourage them.  
 
Table 2 gives an overview of the evolution of practices. Reactions to change as far as 
practices were concerned is similar within given epistemic communities, as noted by Halliday 
(Halliday, 1985) and Robertson et al. (2003). The level of interdependence with the 
environment (in terms of resources and output), and the degree of instrumentation involved, 
polarise scientific practices and the representation scientists have of their own activities.  
The collective dimension is very strong in biology, physics, chemistry, where research is 
carried out through teamwork and cannot make sense at the individual scale. In the epistemic 
community where knowledge production is based on instruments and experimentation, norms 
tend to diffuse by proximity, as the level of interaction amongst actors is high. The recruiting 
process has been affected, in terms of projects rather than students being funding. As far as 
supervising is concerned, the core of this activity has not changed, but professionalization and 
mobility are now stressed, although the doctoral school is not mentioned or used as a resource 
in fostering these two dimensions. 
The individual dimension can be found where science is based on personal thinking and 
manipulation of existing (generally written) material: law, literature, philosophy, 
mathematics. In the epistemic community where knowledge production is not so much based 
on instrumentation, doctoral schools have not fostered new recruiting practices. But they are 
acknowledged as a legitimizing institution for new kind of actions, such as solving 
supervising problems between students and supervisors. The spread of a new norm, even 
where it is not followed, generates a feeling of awkwardness and a self-categorization as 
deviants by the members of these disciplines. 
Table 2: Evolution of practices  
 Evolution of practices Non evolution of practices 
 Response to doctoral 
schools 
Non related Response to 
doctoral schools 
Non related 
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Experiment-
based, 
collectively 
organized 
disciplines 
High 
interdependency 
Close to the 
norm 
• Funding project 
rather than students 
• A move toward 
professionalisation 
• Mobility 
• Increase of 
co-
supervising 
• No evolution of 
supervising core 
activities 
• No inter-
disciplinarity. 
• Absence of 
common 
currency across 
disciplines 
Individual based 
disciplines 
Low 
interdependency 
Far from the 
norm 
• Limited evolution of 
practices: 
Intervention in case 
of problem between 
supervisor and 
student, drawing on 
the legitimacy given 
by doctoral schools 
• A weak move 
towards 
professionalisation 
 • No evolution of 
supervising core 
activities 
• Resistance to 
co-supervising 
• Absence of 
common 
currency across 
disciplines 
 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the evolution of doctoral schools shows that the emerging institution has not 
generate new practices, but rather has legitimized some existing practices and diffused them 
through three mechanisms:  
- Proximity when interdependence amongst actors is high 
- Problem definition, i.e. a situation emerges as a problem when the new institution is 
able to propose a solution 
- Comparisons made possible where overlapping fields are accompanied by a common 
institutional shape, result in the emergence of a particular norm, and creating a new 
category of deviant individuals . Their practices did not change, but their position in 
their professions did: thus they became deviants (Becker, 1963). 
Proximity when interdependence amongst actors is high 
New practices are diffused and adopted by proximity, in a professional environment where 
there is a high level of interdependence. Factors fostering such interdependence can be 
internal (i.e., they come from the practices) or organisational (coming from arrangements set 
up to comply with the new institution). Experimental sciences are characterized by a 
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collective mode of knowledge production. Scientific practices are organised within teams, 
working along shared scientific program, instruments and workplaces (Hackett et al., 2004). 
Research work can be divided into sub-units interdependent on each other. Beyond the team, 
researchers are part of a larger international level ‘competition’ between labs. Amongst other 
factors, as work can be divided in parallel subtasks, the size of the workforce assigned to a 
project determines the speed of discovery, (a critical asset in being competitive in the field): 
the larger the team working on a subject, the quicker it will be likely to perform experiments, 
produce and publish results, and thus gain recognition. PhD students are a workforce for the 
team and they are paid for their research as it is part of a common project. The reward for 
recognition is being able to get credits to pursue further research more easily: “one lends 
money to the rich”, as a chemistry professor puts it.  
By contrast, human and social sciences produce knowledge in an individual mode. Each 
researcher has their own program of research, which are not interdependent with one another. 
Networks do exist, across disciplines or universities; but are not necessarily team-based. The 
tasks performed in every day work are not interdependent. Collective work does exist in this 
research, but not in a stable, organisationally or administratively predetermined frame. The 
notion of a team is “blurry”. This independence of the individuals in the group is reinforced 
by the fact that they usually work outside the university, and therefore there is no justification 
for common, negotiated rules. Practices are defined at the individual level, although a 
somewhat collective dimension starts to develop as soon as interactions arise.  
Funding is not mandatory in those disciplines - in fact, the number of students is higher than 
the number of scholarships available. These are mostly Ministry grants, with some coming 
from the local government, enterprises, etc., and as a result, 80% of students are not funded 
during their PhD. They usually need a job to finance their studies, which is often given as the 
explanation for the longer time they take to complete their PhD (often 4, 5 or 6 years).  
Collective and individual knowledge production come together in the representation of what 
PhD work is. In the collective context, it is a prescribed job, part of an industrialised process 
of knowledge production. For the student, it is both a professional training leading to a job 
and a diploma (supposed to be) recognized by the job market (Mangematin et al., 2003). In 
the individual context, the PhD thesis is a personal project designed by the student, with no 
systematic relation to a professional career outside academia. Since the majority of students 
are not paid, their PhD is more a personal project than a job. For the research department, 
PhD work allows it to develop a pool to recruit future colleagues, and provides a source of 
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scientific production and publication. 
The organisation of scientific production in experimental sciences fosters a high degree of 
interdependence, whereas practices in human and social sciences leave their members 
relatively independent from the community. Practices diffuse more easily in an 
interdependent community. This change mechanism may be illustrated by the evolution of 
selection practices. Selecting a project rather than a student – or more exactly, putting the 
project at the centre of selection and making the project a primary target of the funding – has 
been one of the major evolutions. It has been implemented in experimental sciences doctoral 
schools, where interdependence and teamwork are high, and research departments were 
already organized by projects. A project is already a practice, as scientific production is 
managed in projects, and they are used management tools to coordinate collective research 
activities. The notion of a research program divided into sub-units is a routine to them, and 
the whole idea of a program of projects, putting results together etc. is taken-for granted, part 
of every day job practices. Thus, such schools are able to use the notion of project, as it is 
already an existing tool, and put it at the centre of their organization. In addition, it is coherent 
with their way of organising scientific life. The new institutional arrangements come as a 
relevant tool in organising their scientific life.  
On the contrary, the notion of project does not already exist in human and social sciences. As 
research is mainly an individual activity in these disciplines, projects are not formalised. The 
head of a Literature Doctoral School expresses this sense of the ‘foreignness’ of collective 
practices, such as “making research in a team” and doing co-supervising.  
In the sector of human and social sciences, a researcher is 
first and foremost an individual. The idea of doing 
research within a team is something blurry. Very blurry.  
[…] 
University management is insisting on co-supervising. 
That is, a professor and an assistant supervising together a 
PhD. Sort of an apprenticeship to train assistants to 
supervise. I believe this is already common practice in 
hard science. It is totally unknown for us historians.  
 (nan-dir-hist-cs-lc-28/4) 
It thus appears that practices can travel from research departments to doctoral schools when 
they already exist. Change is thus a generalisation of existing tools, based on existing 
practices. 
Interdependence amongst actors is a strong mechanism for the diffusion of new practices. As 
actors have to work together on a regular basis, sharing equipment, resources and workplace, 
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working on and producing interdependent intermediary results, their practices evolve by 
interaction, through proximity or capillarity. Interdependence can be intrinsic, because of the 
nature of the objects which are manipulated to perform scientific activity or organisational, 
when the rules of resources allocation or the modes of decision are changing. In that way, the 
creation of new institution enhances practice transformation.  
Problem definition 
When interdependency is not central, the engine of change of practices is the emergence or 
the light shed on existing and previously unaddressed problems. The example of Human and 
Social Sciences Doctoral schools may illustrate this point. As research is pretty much 
independent of funding - whether there is funding or not, supervisors can perform their 
research, and can have doctoral students - any institutional arrangement regarding the funding 
can be overcome, or at least contained in a certain area, and have little impact on the rest of 
the organization or on practices. The changes in practice seen in human and social science 
Doctoral Schools are responses to existing problems such as the never-ending thesis. The 
director of a Doctoral Schools can now use the new rules defining the length of the PhD to 
ask the supervisors to justify over-long theses. They also offer a tool that allows the School to 
enter into the bilateral student/supervisor relationship when problems appear. When a 
problem has been identified, the School may offer an alternative configuration, by calling 
other supervisors to break the bilateral relationship, or asking for a second adviser or 
mediation. Given the codification of relationships between academic colleagues, the School 
director cannot intervene as an individual, but can as a collective entity to unlock the 
situation. 
As pointed out by Bourdieu, practices are meant to solve everyday problems, suggesting that 
no change in practices will occur unless the actors themselves in the course of their activity 
identify a new problem. If no problem is identified, or when a suggested new practice is not 
seen as a solution, the new institutional arrangement will “slip” back to previous practices, 
and have no influence on activity. This is the case in the two human and social sciences 
Doctoral Schools, where funding continues to be targeted on students, with the grant being 
seen as a reward to the best student, and in the case of co-supervising of PhD. Here, new 
promoted practices are neither seen as legitimate by the supervisors, nor as solving any 
current problem. Therefore, they will not be adopted and will not lead to further collective 
practices, until in turn, new problems foster the acceptance of alternative practices. 
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New desired practices can be adopted if they allow actors or organisations to address new 
opportunities for action. The new institution gives legitimacy to actors to intervene and solve 
situations that are now defined as problematic. This mechanism depends on the presence of a 
micro-level institutional entrepreneur, who is ready to use the new institution as a resource to 
act. 
Comparison, self-categorization as deviant and delayed effects 
Because of the creation of Doctoral Schools, scientists from different disciplines are 
confronting their practices and noticing that they act in different ways. Biologists are 
astonished that many students in social sciences are not funded. Historians notice that in 
physics, a scientist cannot exist outside a research department.  
Beyond making the comparison possible, the emergence of Doctoral Schools has introduced 
one type of practice as the “norm”. Through the type of norm valued in the new institutional 
arrangement – scientific policy, targeting funding on projects, asking for annual reports on 
PhD lengths, ratios of students to supervisors etc., - Doctoral Schools suggest what the 
desired norm is. A certain type of knowledge production is thus “left outside” the new 
institutional arrangement. A linguist, who is highly supportive of Doctoral Schools, puts it 
very clearly by saying that “there is nothing judgmental in categorizing an activity as 
individualistic; it becomes a problem when one needs to integrate this activity in a research 
department and moreover a doctoral school”. Some activities do not fit into the new 
arrangement, and in turn, the new arrangement does not answer any of the problems related to 
that type of knowledge production. Therefore, there is no intersection between the new 
institutional arrangement and these activities and the professionals involved in them. 
Human and social scientists become aware of the new norm, all the more because they are not 
already involved in it: they notice that the new institutional arrangements are not built for 
them. For example, the grants distribution deadline implies that the Schools projects shortlist 
will be ready in June – but human and social science Schools do not yet have their student 
rankings available by this date, and since they are selecting students, not projects, the deadline 
makes little sense to them.  
Supervisors from human and social sciences tend to categorize themselves as deviant. They 
do not necessarily see themselves as ‘wrong’; rather, they are expressing their worries that the 
system is not really meant for them anymore, or that the ways they are used to doing things 
are no longer legitimate.  
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Self-categorization as deviants is reinforced when institutions have their missions redefined, 
but professions do not necessarily follow the move. The reform promotes professionalization 
as a mission, which is highly supported by the University management. But those supervisors 
whose conception of their profession is built around teaching and research do not see it as part 
of their mission. Another example concerns the concept of professionalization that the reform 
puts forward. A professor of linguistic expressed the gap between his definition of 
professionalization – which includes training in content, for jobs in academia – and what the 
university management means by the term, which he characterises as pressure “to convince 
students to go and look for a job that has nothing to do with what they have studied”. 
The self-categorization as deviants as a consequence of the new institution has three main 
consequences: 
1. When the new institution impacts the definition of the missions of actors (PhD 
supervisors), it also impacts the perception of problems (i.e. the definition of a 
situation as a problem). As previously discussed, it is only when a situation has been 
accepted by those involved in the activity as being a “problem”, that a “solution” can 
be found. Where researchers see the new arrangements as simply not fitting their case, 
they are not seeing themselves as ‘problems” but instead as “deviants” – requiring 
recognition, perhaps, but not “solving”. 
2. Professional identities and practices are closely interrelated, as practices are deeply 
rooted in the way of doing things, on the way of considering problems. Both are 
dealing with values, rules, myths, representations. Ferlie et al. (Ferlie et al., 2005) 
argue that a profession is a “self-regulatory and uni-disciplinary machinery [to…] 
control entry into and exit from professional groups, set and examine training 
programs, validate research, and enforce professional standards. Professional roles are 
prescribed sectorally, shaping the identity of individual professionals,” (p129). 
Professional identity may be a barrier to the adoption of new practices if there is a gap 
between the new institution values and the representation of the professional identity. 
3. Where a new institution is adopted by most of actors, leading to the creation of a 
category of deviants, the fact that these (individual or collective) actors are not 
behaving according to the “rules” becomes more visible. Deviation from the accepted 
institutional order can be costly in different ways: economically (it increases risks), 
cognitively (it requires more thought) and socially (it reduces legitimacy and the 
subsequent access to resources) (Phillips et al., 2004).  
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Comparison and self-categorization as deviant have delayed impacts on practices. They 
modify ways of formulating problems, the norms and values attached to the professional 
identity and the power dynamics amongst actors in terms of accessing resources within the 
organisation.  
CONCLUSION 
Studying the role of texts in institutionalization Taylor and Van Every (2000)4 point out that 
“a text that is not used and cited is not yet a text.”. The same goes for institutions : an 
institution that is not implemented, embodied in practices is not yet an institution. In other 
words, practices must be distributed, shared adapted by other actors if they are to have 
organizing properties and the potential to affect everyday activities. This paper shows a how a 
new institution is implemented and adopted by actors in different ways. Practices may be 
affected or not, influence can be direct or indirect. Institutional change leads to the adoption 
and generalization of practices that already exist somewhere in the organisation, as opposed to 
the creation of new ones.  
Based on the case study of French Doctoral Schools, we identify three mechanisms by which 
a new institution is adopted and impacts work practices. First, in a professional environment 
where a high level of interdependence fosters interaction amongst actors and standardisation 
of practices, the adoption and generalization of practices works by proximity. The high level 
of resource dependency is a facilitating factor. Second, new desired practices can be adopted 
where they allow the actors to address unsolved problems. The new institution gives 
legitimacy to actors to intervene and solve situations now defined as problematic. This 
mechanism depends on the presence of a micro-level institutional entrepreneur, who is ready 
to use the new institution as a resource to act. Third, in the absence of one of these factors 
(interdependency, definition of a new problem/opportunity for action), the new institution 
cannot rely on any concrete device to impact practices, which will therefore tend to remain 
unchanged. The definition of problems is closely related to professional identity: depending 
                                                 
 
4 Taylor JR, Van Every EJ. 2000. The Emergent Organisation: Communication as its site and service. Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah quoted by Phillips et al. 2004.  
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on how an actor defines their mission, they will perceive certain situations as belonging, or 
not, to their scope of action. As a result, some actors will move towards deviance, and become 
threatened as they lose the grounds of legitimacy. An interesting outcome could be where 
such deviance is reinforced, with actors turning it into resistance, and it potentially becoming 
a source of institutional effort to disrupt the new institution. Thus institutional entrepreneurs 
can be both supportive and disruptive for the new institution.  
Finally, as Phillips et al. (2004) show about the constitutive relationship among action, texts, 
discourse and institutions, there is a dialectic dynamic between institution and practices, as 
institutions are based on existing practices and institutional change generating the 
generalization of new practices.  
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